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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
HORACE F. TAYLOR, doing
Business as
TAYLOR MOTOR SER-Y'ICE,
Plaintiff and Respondent
-vsKENNETH B. :MURRAY,
Defendant and Appellant.

Civil Case No.
7570

-vs-

CHARLES P. STUART,
Tlu· rd Party Defendant
and Respondent.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATE~1ENT

OF FACTS
On the 27th day of October, 1949 and prior thereto,
Charles P. Stuart was the owner of, and in possession
of a 1941 Hudson automobile and certificate of title
thereto. On said date the defendant, Kenneth B. Murray,
was the owner of a 1949 Packard automobile, subject
to a conditional sales contract with the Lockhart Finance Company, having a balance due thereon of $2100.00,
upon which contract the plaintiff Taylor was a cosigner. Murray was using this Packard as a "demonstrator'' in his work as a salesman for plaintiff.
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Prior to October 27, 1949, :Murray had on several
occasions approached Stuart for the purpose of selling
the Murray Packard to Stuart but had never been able to
reach a satisfactory agreernent as to the terms of the
sale including the trade-in credit to be allowed Stuart
on the 1941 Hudson Stuart was to turn in on the purchase price of the Packard (tr. 82-83). On October 27,
1949 Murray called on Stuart at his farm in Wellsville,
Utah, at which time Stuart offered to purchase Murray's Packard as follows:

''If you want my car on a trade on your car for
$550.00, go get in it and drive out". (tr. 83)
which offer was accepted by Murray as follows:
"Okay, Charlies, I'm just going to make you a
trade today", (tr. 83)
whereupon a written contract was signed for the purchase by Stuart of the Murray Packard for $2975.00, not
including the sales tax, and a credit was allowed on the
Hudson automobile to Stuart of $550.00 (tr. 83, Pltf's.
Ex. 1). After this contract was signed and at the direction of Murray, Stuart deposited the certificate of registration and the Certificate of Title to the Hudson
in the front seat of the Hudson and later that day
:Murray returned to the Stuart residence and drove the
Hudson away, taking it to his headquarters at the
Taylor garage for repairs and to be placed in condition for resale, where he ordered parts and directed
their installation in order to put the Hudson in a condition for resale (tr. 84).
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The Certificate of Regi8tration and Certificate of
Title and the contraet were taken to the
where

jf urray

Ta~·lor

garage,

maintained his headquarters, and exhib-

ited to Taylor who observed that the Certificate of Title
had not been signed by Stuart (tr. 97). A few days
later and between the dates of October 27, 1949, and
November 9, 1949, ·Murray took the Certificate of Title
to \Yells ville and obtained the signature of Stuart thereon and then returned it to the Taylor garage and
placed it with the other papers (tr. 97-99) where it
remained until these papers were returned to Murray
at the direction of Taylor on the evening of November
9, 1949 ( tr. 92). In the meantime Murray had taken
his Packard to Charles :Miller for repair of a minor
blemish on the body, for which he personally paid the
sum of $11.50 and returned it to the Taylor garage,
for the usual servicing preparatory to delivery to
Stuart. This was done abou·t October 29, 1949, and then
told Ta~·lor his Packard was ready for delivery to
Stuart when he came after it; that the papers were all
clamped together and Murray asked Taylor to complete
the transaction with Stuart ( tr. 91) when he came after
the Packard.
On K ove1nber 9, 1949 ::\Iurray was out of the garage
and Mr. Stuart and wife came after the ~1urray Packard
( tr. 91 161). At this time Taylor sold Stuart a different
Parkard off the show-room floor after a discussion of
the contract with l'tfurray and Stuart drove the new
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Packard away that evening.
Upon the return of Murray later that evening he
was advised by one of Taylor's employees of the sale
to Stuart of a different Packard, an altercation followed
and :Murray terminated his services with Taylor . :Jiurray dmnanded a return to him of the Certificates of
Registration, Title and the contract of sale. They were
delivered to him upon rraylor's direction (tr. 92).
Shortly after this incident Murray returned to the
Taylor garage and drove his Hudson away and took
it to his residence at Wellsville, Utah. Several demands
were made upon him to return the Hudson, but Murray
refused, claiming to be the owner thereof and the Certificate of Title ( r. 52, 53, 94, 95). Taylor then sent a
couple of his men to Wellsville after the Hudson and ren1oved it from the Murray premises without Murray's
consent, knowledge, or approval, against his will and
after Murray had forbidden him to take it. This was
done by making electrical connection to start the motor
since Murray had refused to deliver or surrender the
key to Taylor ( tr. 53). Taylor thereafter sold the Hudson to one John Bybee (tr. 47) and later wrecked
(tr. 209).
Through the interference by Taylor with Murray's
contract with Stuart and the consequence breach of
the contract by Stuart, Murray was forced to default
on his payments to the Lockhart Finance Company and
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they required hin1 to put his Packard in storage at

the Taylor garage and then, without notice to Jf nlTa~r,
Taylor paid off the balance of the conditional sales
contract, took title in his own name and sold the l\f urray
Packard, retaining the entire proceeds of the sale for
himself.
Upon ~Iurrays refusal to surrender the Certificate
of title to the Hudson, Taylor con1menced this action
against defendant :Jiurray, in Claim and Delivery to recover the Certificate of Title ( tr. 1). Defendant answered and counter-claimed in Claim and Delivery seeking
possession of Hudson automobile, also in conversion for
actual damages and attorney fees and a third counterclaim seeking to recover his equity in the Packard automobile in the possession of Taylor through his manipulations ( tr.4-5). The plaintiff Taylor, answered the counter
claims of the defendant. Plaintiff admits that Stuart
entered into a contract with Murray for the sale of the
Murray Packard and the trade-in of the Hudson but
alleged that he rescinded or repudiated said contract
and so informed ~furray, because of fraud; admits that
he took the Hudson automobile from the premises of
:\r urray and alleges that he had no knowledge of Murrys claim to ownership or possession thereof ( tr. 6-10).
When Taylor set up fraud between Murray and Stuart
the defendant filed a Third-Party complaint against
~tuart seeking damages, general and special for breach
of the contract by Stuart (tr. 12-16), to which Stuart
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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answered generally, incorporating the plaintiff's answer to defendant's counter-claims and adopting them
as his own, including the alleged fraud (tr. 17, 18).
Both plaintiff and Third Party defendant (respondents) having admitted the contract and having set up
fraud in the inducement of the contract between Murray and Stuart, it was agreed and stipulated between
<·ounsel that the case should be submitted on the question of fraud only and the verdict of the jury would
control the liability of the parties except as to the
question of law as to whether the $150.00 attorney fee
could be allowed for defending the Claim and Delivery
action (tr. 46-48).
At the conclusion of the evidence the Court submitted the case to the jury on the question of fraud but
notwithstanding the verdict of the jury which found no
fraud ( tr. 31) and in direct disregard thereof, the
Court made Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
entered Judgment against the defendant and appellant
and in favor of the plaintiff and Third Party defendant
(respondents) (tr. 33-40), from which this appeal is
taken.

STATEMENT OF POINTS UPON WHICH APPELLANT INTENDS TO RELY FOR REVERSAL OF
JUDGl\iENT
A. The Court erred in making and entering its
Findings of Fact numbers First, Second Third, Fifth,
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except FiYe-A. Sixth, SeYPn, Eight, Nine and its Conclusions of Law nun1bers One, Two and Three.
B. The Court erred in Inaking and entering its
Judgment and the whole thereof.
C. The Court erred in refusing to enter judgment
in favor of the defendant and Third-Party plaintiff,
the appellant, on his first counter-claim, for the value
of the Hudson or on his second-clailn in conversion and
on his third counter-claim for his interest in the Packard
automobile for $875.00.

D. The Court erred in refusing to give judgment
of Third-Party plaintiff, and against the Third-Party
defendant for the sum of $150.00 attorney fees, costs
and $875.00 for breach of contract.
ARGV~fENT

Point A.
It is the position of _t\ppellant that the stipulation
of the parties through their counsel, at the very outset of this case ( tr. 46-48) as to the issues of the case,
the alleged fraud on the part of Appellant, and the
special findings of the jury (Answers One, Two and
Four, Tr. 31) and the understanding of the Court of
that stipulation (tr. 199) as recorded as follows:

''If the jury finds there was no fraud and answers these questions against you, then as I understand the purport of the original stipulation,
then in that event you're (they're, our correction) entitled to damages against you, which
the Court will . . . . . '',
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is determinative of this case, save and except the legal
question as to whether attroney fees can be awarded
as damages against a party to a contract, whose breach
of his conti·act gives rise to litigation between the other
party and a third party.

It -is further the position of Appellant that the
decisive questions raised by Appellant's Statement of
Points can substantially be sumarized under the following general propositions :
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

With whom was Stuart doing Business~
What was the subject-matter of the transactions~
What did Stuart expect to get~
What did Stuart expect to give~
Was there a contract fully executed~
Was there fraud in the inducement of the con-

tract~

Under proposition a. there can be no doubt that Stuart was doing business with Kenneth B. Murray, and his
is a recognized fact both in the testimony and the
pleading (tr. 6 Parag. 3). Answer to Defendant's
Counter-Claim wherein respondent Taylor pleaded as
follows, in substance: That Stuart and Murray entered
into negotiations for the purchase and sale of the Murray Packard, "***That in order to induce the said
Charles Stewart to ENTER INTO SAID CONTRACT"
the defendant made certain false representations and
that upon discovery of said misrepresentations, Charles
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Stewart ''REPUDIATED ANY AGRE:BJl\fEN" which
he intended to 1nake with this defendant and so informed the defendant of such REPt'DIATION". (tr. 7).
The falsity of this allegation comes fron1 the mouth
of respondent Stuart, himself when he testified:

"Q. Did you ever tell ~fr. lVIurray that he had
misrepresented the car to you~
A. I don't know as I ever seen Mr. Murray after
that time. I tried to get in touch with him, but
he was always a step ahead of us.

Q. But you never did talk to Mr. Murray about
this automobile did you~
A. I never had a chance to talk to him". (tr. 163).
Also again (tr. 164. 165).

'' Q. Well, I just asked you just a minute ago if
you ever complained to him in any way, and now
you say you did~
A. I never complained until I went to settle the
deal in the garage. I never detected****.

Q. But you never complained to Mr. Murray1
A. No."
These allegations and admissions were also adopted
and realleged by Third-Party Defendant, Stuart in hi8
Answer of Third-Party Defendant (tr. 18.) The evidence is also conclusive, and admits of no doubt that
Stuart was doing business with Kenneth B. nfurray and
sueh was known and understood not only by the parties
themselves but by the employes of Taylor also.
Taking the evidence in the sequence given at the
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trial for the c onvenience of the Court and the writer,
Mr. Taylor admits he knew of ·Murray trying to sell
the Murray Packard to Stuart (tr. 57) and again (tr.
58) :

"Q. So you knew then that Mr. Murray had been
negotiating with Mr. Stuart for the sale of his
automobile~

A. Yes, Sir. For HIS automobile'

Q. Yes.
A. Yes, I KNEW THAT".
And again, a moment later:
''A. He had the WRITTEN CONTRACT in his
Sales book". (tr. 58).
Taylor knew in October that .Murray was negotiating for the sale of his Packard (tr. 59). Taylor knew
on November 9, 1949 when Stuart came to the Taylor
garage that Stuart came after the lHURRAY Packard
( tr. 60, 69), further, when Stuart came to the Garage
he looked the Murray Packard over, and then according
to Taylor said: ( tr. 61) "I'm supposed to buy ... ".
then apparently remembering the necessary facts to
support his claim, began to stammer and finally admitted: "***and his wife says they wouldn·'t have the
automobile", and then Taylor siezed upon the opportunity to cut Murray out of the sale of his Packard and
sell a "Taylor" Packard. (tr. 195, 197).
When the 1941 Hudson of Mr. Stuart was brought
in, Taylor admits he knew it was a trade-in ( tr. 68)
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and that he also knew Stuart had not purchased a new
Packard. How then did he know 1 Shnply because he
had seen, and had in his possession the

~I urray-Stuart

co;ntract.
Kenneth B.

~lurray

testified with respect to the

transaction between hin1self and Stuart. To set out this
testimony here would only add volume to these remarks
,\·hen we feel the Court

wil~

readily see that the position

of the Appellant is definitely established by Respondent's own testimony.
Herman Nelson, an employee of respondent Taylor,
knew of the sale of the :Murray Packard to Stuart:
(tr. 137)
''A. ***I remember Ken coming in ·one night and
saying he had sold his car and left the order
and the title and that he was going some place
and would Mr. Taylor take care of the deal when
these people came in''.
And that the title and order were left with Taylor Motor
Service. Further, Nelson testified that the Stuarts
came to the Taylor garage to get the MURRAY PACK-

AHD.
Stuart, the respondent, testified that he begun dealing with Murray in September of 1949 and that Murray
then had a Packard automobile (tr. 155). rrhen immediately folowing this testimony respondents' own counsel
asked this question of Stuart :
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"Q. WHEN WAS THIS DEAL FINALLY
CONSUMATED~''

The answer was October 27, 1949. Stuart then testified
that he had seen the Packard Murray was driving;
that he and Murray finally came to an agreement to
which Murray had already testified ( tr. 157); that the
price was right; the trade-in was right; that he knew
the Packard had been used as a "demonstrator". and
again ( tr. 158) that " The con tract is alright" and then
again charges misrepresentation and fraud.
Stuart also testified (tr. 161) "I made arrangements to buy KEN'S CAR if a '50 model, yes", and
again at page 161 Stuart admits that he came to pick
up KENS l\1URRA Y 'S automobile.
To further establish the existence of an intent to
do business with Murray, Stuart testified (tr. 164))
"My understanding was that his figures were right
here. I would have taken the car if it had been what
it should have been".
There can be no doubt but what Stuart came to
the Taylor garage fully intending to perform the balance
of his contract with Murray and would have done so
had it not been for the intervention of Taylor who was
anxious to sell a new automobile ( tr. 161-163) and it is
n1ore than evident, we think, that the defects in the
automobile alleged, the misrepresentations claimed and
the deceit perpetrated are only synthetic to avoid the
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consequences of a breach of the contract with l\I urray.
At least our belief is supported by the verdict of the
jury who also found to the smue effect.
rraylor testified that when Stuart caine to his garage he encouraged him to go see :J[ urray and make things
right with hiln before he purchased another Packard off
the floor (tr. 60, 62). If neither Taylor or Murray
thought there was an agreement on the MURRAY car
then how can these conversations be explained 1 Considering the evidence, all from Respondents' own witnesses, the conclusions seems inescapable that Stuart
was doing business with Kenneth B. Murray, knew it,
understood it, and that conclusion cannot be avoided
either by the Court or counsel, since the question of the
execution of the contract was put squarely before the
jury upon Stuart's claim that Murray tampered with the
contract after he had signed it in "blank", yet Stuart
still admits "rrhe contract is alright". (tr. 158) and that
the contract bears Kenneth B. Murray's name as the
seller, Stuart's name as the buyer and is the same way
it was drawn when Stuart signed it.
Proposition b. must be too obvious to admit of
argument. The Kenneth B. Murray Packard was the
subject-matter of the contract. From testimony already
quoted ,the price was right the trade-in was right, the
car purchased and listed on the contract was the specific
Packard described by motor and serial number and
belonging to Murray ,it was purchased as a ''demonstra-
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tor", Stuart came to get that specific automobile, and
would have taken it, so he admits, IF IT HAD BEEN
AS REPRESFjN'rED.
To read the testimony would seem to make the
an~wer

to proposition c. evident. Stuart expected to get

the Murray "demonstrator" agreed upon and described
in his written contract with Murray. He came after it
and would have taken it if SOMETHING had not
changed his mind. Stuart and Taylor claim it was fraud
and misrepresentation yet Stuart testified that it was
Taylor who called his attention to the alleged misrepresentations when, Stuart came for the Murray Packard
( tr. 161-163) and then Taylor sold Stuart another Packard off the floor.
What did Stuart expect to give~ Proposition d.
Here again the contract "that is alright" (tr.158) speaks
for itself. Stuart agreed and the ''price is okay (tr.
157) to pay $2975.00 exclusive of taxes, for -the automobile of :Murray's and to receive a credit of $550.00 on that
price for his 1941 Hudson automobile as a trade-in.
When the deal was '' Consun1ated'' he delivered the
Hudson, its Certificate of Registration and Certificate
of Title to Murray at the time the contract was signed
( tr. 83). This part of his contract he performed and
his performance can only be considered as performance
pursu..ant to the contract. ,No other explanation can be, or
was given.
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A reading of the record itself fully answers proposition d. .\ written contract was fnll~· executed and
partially perfonned and so considered by the respondenh~ in their pleadings and testimony (Deft's :B~x. 1, tr.
6, 7, 17). In objeeting to a question on cross-exalnination, Respondent's coun:.-el 1nade the following statement (tr. 64):
•· :Jl r. Preston: I object to that as improper
cross-examination, as no bearing on this case.
This is a deal between Mr. Murray, in which
:Jiurray represented this is a 1949 Packard, and
those people, if they've been defrauded, I immagine they'll sue Mr. Taylor".
At page 155 Stuart testified that the deal had been
''consumated" on October 27, 1949. He further testified: "The contract is alright" ( tr. 157) but alleges
and testified that when the contract was signed it was
blank. If the contract had been blank, which contention
the jury found to be untrue ( tr. 31) would not this be
sufficient to constitute a ratification or adoption~
Stuart acknowledges the contract was as agreed upon
and that he would have taken the Murray Packard but
for the alleged misrepresentations which the jury found
were not made ( tr. 31, 35).
Taylor also acknowledges the contract as follows
(tr. 197):
''I could have kept that title after they brought
it in. I could have did that. I could have kept that
title and all it would have been is a contract. I
wanted to do the right thing".
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The Court itself, recognized the contract and that
defendant should recover judgment in the absence of
fraud (tr. 199.). The jury found there was no fraud.
Next proposition: Was there

fraud~

The case was

tried on the theory there was a contract which had been
repudiated because of fraud (tr. 46, 47) and the Court
so understood ( tr. 199). The jury found no fraud ( tr. 31,
35) and the Court so found and adopted and approved
the findings of the jury on this point ( tr. 35).
We submit the only answers that can be logically
made to the propositions listed above are:
a.
b.
c.
d.

Murray
Kenneth B. Murray's Packard.
Kenneth B. Murray's Packard.
The total sum of $2975.00 plus taxes for which
he was to receive a credit of $550.00 for his
Hudson trade-in.
e. Yes.
f. No.
Turning more specifically to Appellants Statement
of ·Points, we submit the Court was in error in finding
that plaintiff was the owner of and entitled to the imInediate possession of the Certificate of Title to the
1941 Hudson automobile. (Finding First, tr. 35) and
that plaintiff was entitled to the possession of the
Hudson automobile and for failing to find instead of
said finding that the defendant was the owner of and
entitled to the immediate possession of both the Hudson and its Certificate of Title.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
Finding Second (tr. 34) the Court is in error for
the reason set out above.
Finding Third (tr.34).

The Court is in error in

that the finding is incomplete and should have stated
fully and fairly that

~I urray

and Stuart entered into

a written contract for the purchase and sale of the
:Jlurray Packard, "·hich contract was fully executed
and partly performed.
Finding Fourth (tr. 34) is subject to the observations above and further that this finding is squarely
contrary to respondents' pleading, theory and evidence and a further reason the Court is in gross error,
we feel, the intent of Stuart at the tirne of the signing of the certificate of title is wholly immaterial, since
by his own testirnony, he signed the certificate of title,
which by inadventacne he failed to sign when it was
delevered to :Murray, AFTER STUART HAD
BREACHED THE CONTRACT WITH MURRAY
AND AFTER HE HAD PURCHASED A NEW PACKARD FROM TAYLOR. (tr. 168).
Finding Fifth (tr. 34). The only finding that could
be made was that through the default of Stuart, Murray
was required to put his Packard in storage at the instance of the Lockhart Finance Company until the deal
with Stuart was straightened out ( tr. 124-127) and then
without notice to Murray of any kind, Taylor obtained
title thereto by paying off the conditional sales con-
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tract and resold the Murray Packard and retained the
proceeds. At least there would have been no trouble
with the finance company hut for the breach of the contract by Stuart.
That notwithstanding the verdict of the jury and
in disregard thereof, and while paying lip-service to
the verdict of the jury in its Finding Five-A. (tr. 35)
the Court found fraudulent representations were made
Finding Sixth (tr. 36) which in fact deceived Stuart
and that Stuart's breach of the contract was justified.
Appellant further submits that the Court's Finding
Seven ( tr. 37) is beyond any issue joined, beyond the
evidence and squarely contrary to the evidence and contrary to any thory upon which said case was tried; is
far beyond the prepared decree of Counsel for respondents as appears from the papers in the record
itslf (tr. 36-38) and is an issue and findings injected into
this case by the Court itself in an attempt to justify its
other erroneous Findings. We further submit that this
finding is i1nmaterial and contrary to law and is not
sufficient upon which to base any legal conclusion or
judgment.
In connection with the Court's Finding Eight (tr.
37) Appellant submits said finding is grossly contrary
to the evidence in the case and respectfully requests
counsel for respondent to point out any issue on their
part tendered, where· any· demand or request was ever
titade or where there· is a single syllable of testimony
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in the record, either believable or unbelievable whre
any lack of tender of title played any part in this transaction or any alleged justification for Stuart's failure
to abide by his contract. Failure or prospective failure
of consideration is an affirmative defense and unless
pleaded is waived.

Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8C.

But_ the Court recognizing the understanding of the
parties, and explaining their actions found in said
findings (tr. 37) "***the most that ~Iurray ever did in
this respect was to n1ake it possible for Mr. Stuart to
obtain possession only****'' This finding, like finding Seven, is an attempt on the part of the Court to
create and inject an issue the parties themselves never
considered worthy of injection into the case and is
another effort to justify or support its erroneous Findings, Conclusions and Judgment entered in this cause.
The Court finds that Stuart thought he was dealing with
Taylor and even if this was true, it would be immaterial
for the reason that this is a written contract fully executed and partially performed and admitted by the
only person who could complain, to be "alright" and
found by the jury to have been fully completed when
signed and now the Court, on its own initiative and in
total disregard for the writing itself, attempts to avoid
the writing containing the names of the specific contracting parties, the specific property and the specific
price by raising issues and making findings upon which
there are no pleadings, issue or evidence and which
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Stuart seeks to avoid because of ''fraud'' found
to exist by the jury, and then the Court (tr.
notifies the parties that it will not be bound by the
ings of the jury on the issues submitted unless
conform to the pleasure of the Court.

NOT
201)
findthey

Even Counsel for Respondents recognized the effect
and result of the Findings of the jury in his Motion to
Set Aside Y erdict and for Judgment and in his misconcieved Alternative Motion For a New Trial (tr. 32)
which he withdrew after determining the intentions and
"personality" (tr. 204) of the Court (tr. 210).
If the Court is wrong, and we submit it is, in making its Finding of Fact, then it follows that it is wrong
in each of its Conclusions of Law. And again Conclusion
One is a finding of fact which is in error for lack
of evidence and the purported conclusion is contrary
to law and is in disregard of the evidence and the written
contract. Conclusions Two and Three are also in error
for the reasons heretofore argued. Taylor never did
become the owner of or entitled to the possession of the
Hudson automobile but attempted to rest his claim upon
the alleged weakness of the right and title of defendant
which weakness the jury found not to exist.
Points B. C. and D.
Any judgment entered upon such erroneous Finding of Fact and Conclusions of law to back it up, is as
erroneous as the Findings and Conclusions upon which
it is based.
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Under the evidence Appellant is entitled to judgment against Taylor for $550.00 and costs for the reason
the Hudson was sold by Taylor to one John Bybee before
the trial of the case and wrecked by :J1r. Bybee.

This

judgment could be entered on either defendant's FirF;t
or Second Counter-clai1ns.

Defendant

(Appellant)

should be awarded judgment against Taylor for $875.00
and

co~t~

on Appellant's third -Counter-claim as the

value of Appellants interest in the Packard automobile
obtained through the manipulations of Taylor.
Appellant should be awarded judgments against
Third-Party defendant and Respondent Stuart for
$2975.00 less the $2100.00 owing on the Murray Packard
and less any judgment defendant recovered against Taylor. Defendant and Appellant is entitled to the stipulated $150.00 attorney fee against Stuart for breach of
his contract which occasioned the necessity of defendant's defending against Taylor's Claim and Delivery
action. But in this connection we respectfully request
this court to remand the cause to the District Court for
re-determining the value of the services of counsel in the
light of these proceedings.
Counsel
damage in a
tract by one
between the
party.

fees and costs are legitimate items of
case such as this where the breach of conparty thereunto which occasions litigation
other party to the contract and a third
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15 A. J. 552, parag. 144
17 C. J. 809, parag. 135.
1 Rest. Contracts, 531 Parag. 334.
Rules of ·civil Practice, Rule 8.
CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion we submit that a reading of the
testimony, a review of the pleadings, the issues
drawn therefrom, the theory upon which the case
was tried and submitted and the understanding of those issues by the Court as expressed by it,- and of
Counsel will convince this Court that the District
Court was in error in its Finding of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and the Judgment it entered and the case
should be reversed and remanded with directions to
enter judgment in favor of Appellant and against the
Respondents and to leave the question of special dam- _
ages to the Appellant open for further testimony.
Respectfully submitted,
MARRINER M. MORRISON ·
H. A. Sjostrom
Attorneys for Appellant.
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